Why Iran tore up the Cairo Accord and why it matters

Euella Scott-King
5 days ago
5 min read

The IAEA’s latest censure vote has triggered the collapse of the last inspection mechanism on Iran’s nuclear programme. Tehran’s response was immediate, predictable and strategically significant. Here is what happened and why it matters for the war.

VIENNA, The United Nations watchdog’s 35-nation IAEA Board of Governors passed a US-backed resolution on Wednesday, 10 June, to censure Iran for failing to clarify the status of its 60% enriched uranium stockpile. The vote was expected, but the central consequence was immediate: Iran declared the Cairo Accord void and ended the last inspection mechanism for its most sensitive nuclear material. This left Iran’s 60% stockpile completely unmonitored at a moment when the wider war is already unstable, as reported by “House of Saud”[1].

1. What was the vote, and how did countries line up

The resolution passed with 19 votes in favour, 3 against and 12 abstentions.

The three states that voted against were Russia, China and Burkina Faso (a country in West Africa).

Those voting in favour included the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, who drafted the resolution. Saudi Arabia also voted in favour. The remaining yes votes came from the majority of Western and aligned states on the Board.

The IAEA does not publish individual voting records, so the full list of abstentions is not publicly available. What is clear is that the abstention bloc has grown significantly compared with previous years.

2. How did the vote compare with the last time this happened

The shift in voting patterns is significant.

In 2022, the Board censured Iran by a vote of 30 to 2, with 3 abstentions [2].

In 2026, the vote was 19 to 3, with 12 abstentions.

Support for censuring Iran has almost halved, while abstentions have quadrupled. Tehran pointed to this as evidence that the censure mechanism is losing legitimacy.

Back in November 2025, a similar censure triggered Iran to void the Cairo Accord for the first time. Iran warned that it would do the same again if censured in June 2026, and it followed through.

3. What was Iran’s objection to the resolution

Iran rejected the resolution as illegal and unjustified. It argued that the censure was a political weapon used by the United States and the E3, not a technical judgment based on safeguards obligations.

Iran’s mission to the IAEA also described the draft resolution as a justification for another aggression by the United States, arguing that Washington was manufacturing a crisis to create political cover for further pressure, as reported by PressTV [4].

Tehran said it was being punished for the consequences of the June 2025 United States and Israeli strikes on safeguarded nuclear facilities. Iranian officials claimed that the ambiguity and lack of access cited in the resolution were created by those attacks, not by Iranian obstruction. US/Israeli strikes during the 40-day war directly hit and damaged nuclear sites,

Iran also repeated its allegation that information from the IAEA had been leaked to Israel and used to support the strikes. The Board did not investigate this claim before voting.

PressTV also claimed that Iran had provided extensive cooperation to the Agency and that the resolution deliberately ignored this [4].

State media framed the resolution as an attempt to whitewash aggression. They called it a dangerous attempt to legitimise attacks on Iranian facilities. Tehran Times said the United States and the E3 bore responsibility for the consequences. IRNA said the United States and Israel had killed the Cairo Agreement.

4. What was Iran’s response to the vote

Iran’s response was immediate and had been preannounced.

Foreign Minister Araghchi declared the Cairo Accord void. He said the United States and the E3 had killed the agreement. A formal termination letter was sent to the IAEA Director General, Rafael Grossi, within hours.

Iran then ended all inspection cooperation under the Cairo framework. According to "House of Saud", this removed the last mechanism that allowed the IAEA to verify the 440.9 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium held in Iran.

5. What is the Cairo Accord, and why did Iran tear it up

The Cairo Accord was signed on 9 September 2025 in Egypt. It was negotiated after Iran suspended cooperation with the IAEA following the June 2025 strikes, which had occurred mid-negotiation. The Cairo Accord agreement was signed by Araghchi for Iran and Grossi for the IAEA in Egypt.

The Accord restored limited access to all declared nuclear facilities, including those damaged in the attacks. It allowed the IAEA to verify Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile and provided the only functioning inspection channel during the war.

Iran tore it up for two reasons, both tied to the censure.

First, Iran’s stated position is that the censure resolutions are illegal and politically motivated. Tehran argues that the IAEA failed to investigate its allegation that site information was leaked to Israel. It says it is being punished for being attacked.

Second, Iran treats censure resolutions as automatic escalation triggers. The Supreme National Security Council pre-plans the response, the Supreme Leader authorises it, and the Atomic Energy Organisation executes it. Once the Board votes, the sequence follows. This has now happened twice.

6. What is the likely impact of this on the war

The consequences are serious, says “House of Saud”

Verification is now gone. The 440.9 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium are completely unmonitored, widening the verification gap at a critical moment in the conflict.

Iran’s nuclear escalation becomes easier, they claim. United States intelligence assessments cited in the article say Iran is likely to install more advanced centrifuges, increase its stockpile or enrich to 90%. This is, of course, speculation solidifying as fact in the minds of the resolution proposers. The article notes that Iran has already completed most of the technical work needed to reach weapons-grade.

Diplomatic tracks collapse further. Iran has linked nuclear verification to other unresolved issues in the war, including the Strait of Hormuz, frozen assets and ceasefire terms. Nuclear diplomacy can no longer be separated from the battlefield.

The risk of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty increases. Iran has already threatened to do so in the face of continued censure. The article draws a direct parallel to North Korea’s trajectory between 1993 and 2006.

Observers of the region might ask: Why did the Board of Governors vote for a resolution likely to achieve the opposite of what they say they want? Clearly, they knew it would end the Cairo Accord, remove verification and increase the nuclear threat they face.

Some will argue that the war is becoming more dangerous. Without verification, intentions are harder to read. The risk of miscalculation rises. Others will say this is part of the narrative the enemies of Iran are spinning. Could it be they want to paint a picture of Iran as having weapondary intentions so they can justify the compulsion to act preemptively, as they did in Iraq 20 years ago, using the same pretext? Iran may feel freer to escalate regionally. The Strait of Hormuz remains restricted. Any future ceasefire becomes harder to negotiate.

The overall impact is clear. The vote has accelerated the nuclear dimension of the war, collapsed the last inspection channel, and increased the likelihood of further escalation on all fronts, as we are seeing at the time of writing this, Day 103 of the war!

References

House of Saud. Riyadh voted for censure that ended the last nuclear safeguard.
Reuters. IAEA Board of Governors votes to censure Iran, June 2022.
Newsweek. Map and breakdown of the June 2025 IAEA censure vote.
PressTV. Justification for another aggression, Iran mission slams US proposed draft IAEA resolution, June 2026.

The E3 refers to the United Kingdom, France and Germany (the three European states that coordinate closely on Iran policy). These three European states coordinate closely on Iran policy and often act jointly within the IAEA and the wider nuclear diplomacy framework.