Why Turkey’s old maritime doctrine is on Israel’s radar

Euella Scott-King
May 24
6 min read

Updated: May 26

An Old Doctrine in a New Context

Earlier this month, Israel’s Channel 13 featured Turkey’s Blue Homeland Doctrine (Mavi Vatan). The timing was striking: Israel is fighting the resistance on several battle fronts, so why become concerned with a Turkish maritime strategy from 2006? [1] The doctrine itself isn’t new – so why now?

The report did not treat Blue Homeland as an abstract map or a dormant idea. Instead, it framed Turkey as a state that is “no longer just drawing maps”, but “implementing the doctrine in practice”; building what it described as a maritime corridor stretching “from Greece to Yemen” [2]. It noted Turkey’s active influence in Libya, Somalia and Syria. According to the piece, Israel now regards Turkey as a “complex strategic challenge”, suggesting Ankara is “filling a geopolitical vacuum” while Israel is distracted by concurrent conflicts in Iran, Gaza and Lebanon.

The broadcast was not a curiosity. It was a signal that, in Israel’s strategic imagination, Turkey has re‑entered the frame, if ever it left.

A Doctrine born of Geography; fueled by Grievance

To fully understand why Blue Homeland is resurfacing now, it helps to understand why it was created in the first place. The Blue Homeland Doctrine emerged from a long‑standing Turkish perception of being hedged in by the geography of the Aegean Sea. Hundreds of Greek islands sit just off Turkey’s western coastline, some only a few kilometres away. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), each island generates its own territorial waters, Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf. (See diagram.) Applied literally, this would create a near‑continuous wall of Greek maritime zones along Turkey’s coast — a legal geometry that Turkish strategists argue is impossible, unworkable and fundamentally unjust.

This sense of encirclement is not merely legalistic. It is emotional, historical and strategic. Turkish naval thinkers have long argued that the Aegean’s island configuration leaves Turkey trapped in a narrow maritime corridor, dependent on Greek goodwill for access to the wider Mediterranean. Blue Homeland was conceived as the antidote: a doctrine asserting that Turkey’s maritime rights extend across 462,000 km2 of the surrounding seas and that Ankara must defend those rights with the same vigour it defends its land borders.

Explore: How UNCLOS Works and Why It Fails in the Aegean Sea

The Gas Fields That Turned Maps Into Power Plays

But Blue Homeland isn’t just about maps and boundaries; it’s also about energy. When major gas fields were discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean in the last decade, maritime borders suddenly became lucrative. If UNCLOS rules were enforced to the letter, Turkey would miss out on much of this potential wealth. Blue Homeland, in Ankara’s view, is about ensuring those resources aren’t entirely commandeered by rivals.

According to Trends Research & Advisory, Ankara believes it is being deliberately constrained by Greece, Greek Cyprus and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean energy architecture [3]. This belief is not fringe; it is mainstream within Turkish strategic circles and shapes Ankara’s approach to everything from drilling disputes to naval deployments.

Why Israel Suddenly Looked North; and Saw Turkey

Channel 13's timing indicates a deeper shift. Israel is waging war on multiple fronts - Iran, Gaza, Lebanon - while carrying out regular strikes in Syria. Its tactical bandwidth is overexpanded. Against this backdrop, Turkey’s expanding regional footprint is no longer a distant concern; it is emerging as a structural challenge.

Al Jazeera’s January 2026 analysis argued that Israeli actions in Syria increasingly resemble a strategy of indirect pressure designed not to confront Turkey directly, but to constrain its influence by entrenching instability along its southern flank [4]. The same piece noted Israel’s preference for a fragmented regional security landscape, echoing the ideas of a close ally of Netanyahu, right‑wing theorist Yoram Hazony, who has long advocated breaking large states into smaller, sectarian units.

Seen through this lens, Turkey’s growing reach, from Libya to Somalia, is not simply a foreign policy expansion. It is a challenge to Israel’s preferred regional order.

Is Turkey implementing Blue Homeland? The evidence suggests "Yes!"

The Channel 13 report’s central claim: Turkey is implementing Blue Homeland “in practice” is supported by developments across the region.

Turkey has renewed its military cooperation with Libya, maintaining drones, advisors and naval assets in support of Tripoli [6][7][8]. It has expanded its presence in Somalia, signing a defence pact in 2024 that grants Ankara rights to develop Somali naval forces and build a new naval base [9][10]. It maintains troops and intelligence networks in northern Syria. And it has revived Blue Homeland rhetoric in official speeches, with President Erdoğan describing the doctrine as a “national cause” [11].

These moves are not isolated. They form a coherent arc — a maritime and military footprint stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf of Aden. It is this arc that Channel 13 described as a “corridor”, and it is this arc that makes Blue Homeland newly relevant in today's geopolitical environment.

Explore: Blue Homeland doctrine Explainer

Turkey’s Naval Flex; and Why Israel Noticed

The most visible expression of the doctrine came in April 2026, when Turkey conducted Mavi Vatan 2026, a tri‑theatre naval exercise involving 120 vessels, 50 aircraft and 15,000 personnel; the largest Blue Homeland exercise since 2019 [5]. The exercise spanned the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, demonstrating Turkey’s ability to operate simultaneously across three maritime fronts.

For Ankara, this was a message of deterrence and capability. For Athens, it was a rehearsal for contested maritime enforcement. Evidently, Israel noticed the spectacle across the bay; it served as a reminder that Turkey’s naval reach is no longer theoretical.

Israel’s response: containment, not confrontation

Avoiding direct conflict with Turkey, for now at least, Israel is pursuing a strategy of containment; it has deepened its ties with Greece and Cyprus, strengthening military cooperation and energy coordination. It continues to strike targets in Syria, fragmenting the environment along Turkey’s southern flank. And in late 2025, Israel recognised Somaliland, the breakaway region of Somalia; a move widely interpreted as a counter to Turkey’s expanding presence in the Horn of Africa, not to mention Turkey’s own support of the “mother country” - Somalia. In early 2026, Israel opened an embassy in Somaliland, reinforcing the signal.

This approach aligns with the fragmentation logic described in Al Jazeera’s analysis: i.e. weakening or decentralising neighbouring states to limit the influence of regional rivals [4].

Two States, No Ambassadors, and Rising Suspicion

All of this is unfolding against the backdrop of a sharp deterioration in Turkey-Israel relations between 2023 and 2024; ambassadors were withdrawn, defence exports suspended, intelligence cooperation frozen and public accusations escalated dramatically [13][14][15][16]. Albeit one might say they have a “working relationship” today, their ambassadors have yet to be restored. In such an environment, any Turkish military doctrine, especially one tied to maritime expansion, will appear more threatening to an observant Israel.

Is Turkey Israel’s next strategic target?

Al Jazeera posed this question directly in September 2025: “Is Türkiye Israel’s next target in the Middle East?” [17]. The question is provocative, but it reflects a genuine strategic anxiety. If Israel’s long‑term approach is to maintain regional dominance by ensuring its neighbours remain weak, decentralised or internally divided, then a rising Turkey – confident, militarily capable and regionally ambitious – could place it in the firing line as the next regional power to contend with after Iran.

Israel is not presently seeking confrontation. But it is clearly seeking to shape the environment around Turkey’s expanding influence.

Conclusion: A doctrine reborn in a region on fire

The Blue Homeland Doctrine began as a maritime legal argument. Now it has become a geopolitical project; one that intersects with energy politics, naval power, regional alliances and the shifting balance of influence in a Middle East defined by war and fragmentation.

Channel 13’s report was not of a Turkey-academic exercise; it was in recognition that Turkey’s maritime doctrine is no longer a map in a drawer. It is a living strategy, which Turkey is overtly parading across multiple theatres, at a moment when Israel’s strategic bandwidth is stretched and the regional order is in flux. The fact that the program aired demonstrates someone is paying attention.

References

Origins of the Blue Homeland Doctrine (2006) – Admiral Cem Gürdeniz.
Channel 13 (Israel), 2026 segment on Turkey’s maritime expansion.
Trends Research & Advisory, Mapping Türkiye’s Growing Naval Power.
Al Jazeera, “Is the Eastern Mediterranean becoming Israel’s new front against Türkiye?”, 9 January 2026.
Daily Sabah, “Türkiye showcases naval strength in Blue Homeland”, 2026.
Reuters, “Turkey renews military cooperation deal with Libya”, Jan 2024.
AP News, “Turkey maintains drones and advisors in Libya”, 2024.
Al‑Monitor, “Turkey deepens its entrenchment in western Libya”, 2024.
Reuters, “Turkey signs defence pact with Somalia”, Feb 2024.
Middle East Eye, “Turkey to build naval base in Somalia”, 2024.
Anadolu Agency, Erdoğan speeches referencing “Blue Homeland”, 2023–2024.
Al‑Monitor, “Return of Blue Homeland discourse”, 2024.
Reuters, “Turkey recalls ambassador; Israel suspends defence exports”, 2023.
AP News, “Erdoğan accuses Israel of genocide”, 2024.
Haaretz, “Israel freezes intelligence cooperation with Turkey”, 2024.
Al‑Monitor, “Turkey blocks Israeli shipping”, 2024.
Al Jazeera, “Is Türkiye Israel’s next target in the Middle East?”, 21 September 2025.